The Contradiction in China's Gradualist Banking Reforms by Wendy Dobson & Anil K. Kashyap
The Contradiction in China’s
Gradualist Banking Reforms
DURING CHINA’S TWO and a half decades of economic reform, it has often
been observed that the bank-dominated ﬁnancial system is the economy’s
Achilles’ heel. Since 2003, China’s central government has reformed the
largest state-owned commercial banks to improve their competitiveness
before opening the banking industry to foreign competitors, as mandated as
part of the country’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Reform of these banks has markedly improved their performance, but the
process has been gradual, and underlying problems remain.
One can assess these developments in two contrasting ways. The ﬁrst
is optimistic: the Chinese authorities can afford to reform the state-owned
banks gradually because of the economy’s growth momentum, the small
public sector debt-to-GDP ratio, the size of China’s foreign exchange







We thank Patrick Honohan, Nicholas Lardy, and Lawrence Summers for comments.
We also thank the China Center for Economic Research (CCER) for cosponsoring a 2005
conference with the National Bureau of Economic Research where the authors began col-
laborating on these issues, and Laurina Zhang for outstanding research assistance. Anil
Kashyap thanks the Center for Research in Security Prices, the Stigler Center, and the
Initiative on Global Financial Markets, all at the University of Chicago Graduate School of
Business, for research support. Wendy Dobson acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the
Research and Conference Fund at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and the
generosity of CCER, which opened its facilities to her during a visit in 2005. The views
expressed in this paper are our own and not necessarily those of any of the organizations
with which we are afﬁliated or that sponsored this research.
1. Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Perkins (2006) make this argument about reform of state-
owned enterprises (which, as we will show, is closely linked to banking sector reform); see
a similar argument for the banks in Allen, Qian, and Qian (2006, pp. 21–22).
10269-03a_Dobson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 103perspective by Jonathan Anderson notes that the removal of nonperform-
ing loans (NPLs) from bank balance sheets has substantially reduced their
ﬁnancial risk, even if those NPLs have not all been resolved.
2
The alternative assessment is more skeptical, highlighting the depth of
reforms and bank restructuring that remain. Nicholas Lardy has empha-
sized, as have others more recently,
3 that, in China as elsewhere, an efﬁcient
banking system is essential to the efﬁcient allocation of capital and the trans-
mission of monetary policy, and it is closely tied to capital account convert-
ibility and other economic objectives. The gradual pace of reform in China,
particularly of the government’s involvement in bank ownership and deci-
sionmaking, postpones the day when such a system arrives. This choice of
continued public sector involvement reﬂects a basic trade-off between, on
the one hand, greater efficiency in state-owned institutions, of which the
banks are an important part, and, on the other, stable employment growth
and, more recently, rural-urban and regional equality.
The Chinese authorities seek rapid economic growth and employment
creation sufficient to absorb the country’s surplus labor force, which
consists of new entrants, rural-urban migrants, and those laid off from
money-losing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In the past two decades, the
banks have been enlisted to support the SOEs as well as to ﬁnance infra-
structure investments and export platforms through policy lending (lend-
ing based on policy objectives or political criteria and connections rather
than creditworthiness). Addressing the growing rural-urban and regional
inequality is the centerpiece of China’s 11th Five Year Program, approved
by the National People’s Congress in early 2006. The program seeks more
balanced urban and rural development by improving public services in the
rural areas and by increasing urbanization.
We are skeptics on the issue of gradual banking reform. It is not uncom-
mon for former command economies to undertake reform gradually in
order to prevent widespread unemployment. As this paper will show, how-
ever, the dependence of China’s government-afﬁliated ﬁrms on the state-
owned banks for their working capital means that the banks are forced to
satisfy contradictory objectives: ﬁnancing employment and social stability
while transforming themselves into commercially viable corporate enti-
104 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
2. Anderson (2006).
3. Lardy (1998). See also, among others, Podpiera (2006), Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (2005), and Asian Development Bank (2006a).
10269-03a_Dobson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 104ties. Further, we argue, the Chinese government is proceeding in a way
that ignores this contradiction.
The impact of continued government ownership of the banks is appar-
ent in current institutional arrangements. Just as China’s high average
growth rates conceal large disparities between the three large coastal
urban agglomerations—around Beijing, the Yangtze River Delta (Shang-
hai), and the Pearl River Delta (Hong Kong, Guangdong, Shenzen)—and
the rest of the country, the banking system remains fragmented and
often dominated by still-independent local branches and decisionmakers,
whose objectives may differ from those of the Beijing headquarters.
4 We
provide aggregate data and bank-level statistical evidence showing that
inefﬁciencies persist in lending by China’s largest banks.
The available evidence persuades us that government inﬂuences, inten-
tional and unintentional, will continue to constrain bank reform, with all
the performance weaknesses that such inﬂuence implies. Eight years ago,
Lardy described many of these weaknesses and proposed corrective mea-
sures: remove the NPLs (he suggested using a swap of government bonds
for bad bank debt); impose hard budget constraints on SOE borrowers;
increase competition in the banking sector, including through the creation
of privately owned banks; strengthen bank supervision and prudential
regulation; liberalize interest rates; reform taxes; make the central bank
independent; and move all future policy lending into government-owned
policy banks.
5 Although some of these weaknesses have been corrected,
majority government ownership of the banks has not.
6 We see no signs that
this cornerstone of banking policy will change for the large banks that are
the focus of this paper. Meanwhile the contradiction between the rhetoric
calling for efﬁcient banks and the de facto pressures on the banks to mis-
direct credit persists.
The paper begins with a brief description of China’s banking system,
focusing on the largest banks and examining several factors that encour-
age optimism about the current reform strategy. We then reconsider these
reforms in light of the history of ﬁnancing SOEs and infrastructure invest-
ment that underlies China’s policy lending. We identify a number of reasons
to expect a continuation of misdirected credit, and on that basis we predict
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4. See Roach (2006) for more details.
5. Lardy (1998, pp. 140–82).
6. See Honohan (2004) for a forceful argument as to why this is the key weakness.
10269-03a_Dobson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 105that the transition to a modern efficient banking system is likely to take 
a long time. Next we explore the risks that lie ahead for China’s banks,
highlighting the likely problems should economic growth slow. Finally, we
examine two alternative approaches to reduce the inherent contradiction
between government inﬂuence and modern, efﬁcient banks.
An Overview of China’s Banking System
China’s banking system consists of a number of institutions, most of
which are owned by various levels of government (tables 1 and 2).
7 The
Big Four state-owned commercial banks dominate the system, accounting
for more than half of bank assets. They include the Bank of China (BOC),
the China Construction Bank (CCB), the Industrial and Commercial Bank
of China (ICBC), and the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). A ﬁfth,
much smaller but rapidly growing bank, the Bank of Communications
(BoCom), is increasingly included in the group, which is then referred to
as the Big Five.
8 ABC’s future is uncertain because of the sheer size of its
problems (large volume of NPLs, questionable management practices, and
the anticipated cost of a bailout). Oxford Analytica estimates that ABC’s
2005 NPLs amounted to 739 billion yuan (more than $90 billion),
9 which
is considered to be an underestimate following auditors’ ﬁndings of
extensive fraudulent loans and underreporting of NPLs.
The dominance of these institutions is a legacy of past government deci-
sions to liberalize the banking system. Between 1949 and the late 1970s,
the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) functioned as both the central bank
and the only deposit-taking and lending institution.
10 In the late 1970s
(1984 in the case of ICBC) the Big Four were created as state-owned banks
with policy lending mandates, while the PBOC continued as the central
bank and supervisor of the ﬁnancial system. The missions of the Big Four
differed according to the sector in which they were directed to specialize,
106 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
7. China has at least one privately owned commercial bank, Minsheng Bank, which
was set up in 1996 by the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce.
8. Depending on data availability, we include BoCom in some, but not all, of the 
discussion in this section.
9. Oxford Analytica, “China: Prospects Recede for the ABC,” May 5, 2006.
10. See Allen, Qian, and Qian (2006) for a more complete history and an excellent
overview of the entire ﬁnancial system.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10269-03a_Dobson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 108but all but ABC developed close linkages with the nonﬁnancial SOEs. Ini-
tially, SOE losses were ﬁnanced from the national treasury, which relied
heavily on bond ﬁnancing. As the ﬁscal deﬁcit grew, however, the central
government forced the SOEs to meet their ﬁnancial requirements with
bank loans.
11 The SOEs regarded this bank debt as working capital; busi-
nesses losses and defaults were dealt with by additional borrowing.
Since 1995 the government has introduced institutional and regulatory
reforms to transform the Big Four into commercial banks.
12 The PBOC
introduced prudential norms for lending, and regulatory standards were
tightened. Three new policy banks were created to take over the policy
lending functions. The PBOC also created regional offices, which in
principle have sufficient clout to help reduce the politicization of bank
lending practices. Money-losing industrial SOEs were also transformed
by restructuring or selling them, and thousands were closed. By 2004 the
number of industrial SOEs had fallen below 32,000, and their employ-
ment had dropped by 17 million since 1998, to 20.5 million.
13 The han-
dling of the debts of defunct enterprises has been a contentious issue
between the central and local governments, however, because of the
local priority to minimize the impact on employees rather than repay the
government-owned creditors.
Clearing Up the NPLs
NPLs were removed from bank balance sheets in several steps that were
seen as precursors to the banks’ modernization.14 The ﬁrst step was in 1998,
when the government issued 270 billion yuan ($32.6 billion) in special
bonds acquired by the banks themselves and then converted into equity,
thereby doubling the capital base of the Big Four. In 1999 NPLs valued at
$168.1 billion were transferred from the banks to four newly created asset
management companies (AMCs). The AMCs issued bonds guaranteed 
by the Ministry of Finance to the banks. The next step was taken in 2004
as the banks prepared for listing on public stock exchanges. Capital injec-
tions totaling $45 billion were made to CCB and BOC from the central
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11. Lardy (1998, p. 38).
12. Lardy (2004, pp. 101–02) details these reforms.
13. China Statistical Yearbook 2005, tables 14-7 and 14-9.
14. See Ma (2006a) for a detailed analysis.
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15. Jie Feng, “ICBC Improves Following Restructuring,” China Daily, January 20, 2006.
16. ICBC 2005 annual report, p. 75.
17. These transfers are estimated at 350 billion yuan ($43.8 billion) for all banks. 
Ma (2006a).
18. We arrive at this ﬁgure by noting that the direct injections were $168.1 billion and
$60 billion, respectively. Assuming a maximum recovery rate on these loans of 25 percent
gives a total of $171.1 billion. To this we add $69.4 billion for the postrecovery total losses
associated with the $92.6 billion in ABC NPLs that have yet to be tackled (see table 3).
19. Ma’s (2006a) estimate totals $505.9 billion or 21.8 percent of GDP for the entire
banking system (including the rural credit cooperatives). He does not include any estimate
for ABC. To obtain our high-end estimate, we added to our $240 billion estimate the 1998
bond issue ($32.6 billion), the Ministry of Finance’s equity write-offs ($74.4 billion minus
the ministry’s $15 billion stake in ICBC, in our estimate), the PBOC’s carve-out of NPLs
in 2004–05 ($50 billion), foreign investor premiums ($3.8 billion), and the banks’ windfall
proﬁts ($43.8 billion).
bank’s foreign exchange reserves. A recent article in China Daily describes
ICBC’s rehabilitation, in which it received a $15 billion transfer through the
same type of mechanism in 2005 and transferred $35 billion in NPLs
from its balance sheet to AMCs.
15 The Ministry of Finance took an equity
stake equal to $15 billion.
16 With these capital injections totaling $60 bil-
lion from foreign exchange reserves, bank capital adequacy ratios were
restored to 8 percent once the banks had written off their remaining bad
loans. Estimates by Guonan Ma include equity write-offs by the ﬁnance
ministry of 616 billion yuan ($74.4 billion) and, since 2004, further NPL
transfers resulting in 400 billion yuan ($50 billion) in losses, borne by the
PBOC. He also estimates that the equity stakes and shares purchased by
foreign strategic investors (see below) involved a premium of 30 billion
yuan ($3.8 billion). Finally, Ma argues that, through 2005 at least, the
banks had also received some windfall proﬁts as a result of repressed
deposit ﬁnancing costs.
17
As we explain in the appendix, determining the exact full cost of
these bailouts is difficult. We estimate that counting the first and second
round of recapitalizations plus the unresolved NPLs of ABC implies
that the total cost to taxpayers will exceed $240 billion.
18 Ma’s esti-
mates, accepting his assumptions, could add a further $189.6 billion. 
In other words, the cost of cleaning up the Big Four’s misdirected 
loans through 2005 can be conservatively put at roughly 10.4 percent 
of China’s 2005 GDP, and adding Ma’s estimates could bring the 
total to as high as 18.5 percent.
19 Table 3 shows that these transfers
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Table 3. Reported NPLs of the Big Four Banks, 2000–05
Billions of yuan except where stated otherwise
a
2000 2001 2002
% of % of % of
Bank Loans NPLs total Loans NPLs total Loans NPLs total
ICBCb 2,413.6 831.0 34.4 2,659.5 792.0 29.8 2,957.8 760.9 25.7
BOC
c 1,505.8 409.6 27.2 1,585.3 436.0 27.5 1,816.2 408.5 22.5
ABC 1,484.3 n.a. n.a. 1,646.2 n.a. n.a. 1,913.0 472.3 24.7
CCB
d 1,386.4 281.0 20.3 1,505.9 291.4 19.4 1,766.4 268.0 15.2
Totals
e 6,790.1 1,521.6 28.7 7,396.9 1,519.5 26.4 8,473.5 1,930.4 22.8
Memoranda:
GDP 8,934.1 9,859.3 10,789.8
Loans (% of  76.0 75.0 78.5
GDP)
2003 2004 2005
% of % of % of
Bank Loans NPLs total Loans NPLs total Loans NPLs total
ICBC
b 3,346.9 720.8 21.5 3,707.7 784.7 21.2 3,289.6 154.4 4.7
BOC
c 1,750.1 319.7 18.3 1,735.5 98.5 5.7 1,800.1 98.2 5.5
ABC 2,268.4 695.5 30.7 2,590.1 692.3 26.7 2,829.3 740.4 26.2
CCB
d 1,996.0 85.3 4.3 2,227.4 87.4 3.9 2,458.4 94.5 3.8
Totals
e 9,361.4 1,821.3 19.5 10,260.7 1,662.9 16.2 10,377.4 1,087.5 10.5
Memoranda:
GDP 12,173.0 16,028.0 18,549.6
Loans (% of  76.9 64.0 55.9
GDP)
Sources: Bank annual reports; BOC June 2006 offering memorandum; CEIC data.
a. Columns may not sum to totals, or percentages to 100 percent, because of rounding. NPLs as percent of total are based on 
the Bank for International Settlements’ ﬁve-category loan classiﬁcation.
b. Data for 2004 are from ICBC’s 2005 annual report and differ from those in the 2004 annual report.
c. Data from 2003 on are for domestic loans only.
d. Data for 2003 are from CCB’s 2004 annual report and differ from those in the 2003 annual report.
e. In 2000 and 2001, NPLs and percentage shares are for only the three banks reporting.
cleared sufficient NPLs from three of the banks’ balance sheets so that,
with the exception of ABC, NPL ratios reached single-digit levels by the
end of 2005.
Capital Stakes from Strategic Investors
The second part of the strategy to reform the banks is to attract strate-
gic foreign investors who will contribute not only capital but also inde-
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pendent foreign directors to bank governance, and bring in foreign man-
agement skills and new products, improving efficiency and enhancing
potential returns on investment. China limits foreign ownership in a sin-
gle bank to 20 percent of total equity for a single foreign investor and to
25 percent for all foreign investors.
20 Larger stakes would require that
the banks be treated by the regulators as foreign banks. Table 4 shows
that foreign investments totaling $13.3 billion were made in the Big
Five in 2004–05.
Initial Public Offerings
The third part of the current strategy is for the banks to list on foreign
stock exchanges. This is intended to impose market pressures on directors
and managers to bring the accuracy and transparency of their reporting up
to international standards and to subject bank performance to market
appraisals of efﬁciency and proﬁtability. BoCom was the ﬁrst to take this
route in June 2005, when it raised more than $2 billion in an initial public
offering (IPO) in Hong Kong; CCB followed in October 2005 and raised
$8 billion; BOC raised $11.2 billion in Hong Kong in June 2006 and fol-
lowed this with a listing of A shares in Shanghai, which raised $2.5 billion.
(A shares may be held only by mainland Chinese and certain foreign institu-
tional investors.) In October 2006 ICBC’s IPO was hugely oversubscribed,
eventually raising $21.9 billion by issuing shares in both markets and
exercising an overallotment agreement.
Our interviews with bank managers indicate that these IPOs are having
the desired effect: the questions and published reports of analysts are
pressuring bank management to shift away from its traditional goal of
growing assets and market share toward emphasizing rates of return on
assets and increased proﬁtability. Table 5 reports basic information on the
three banks with publicly traded shares as of the end of 2005. It is too
soon to show annual rates of change for the performance of these banks
since their listing. Table 6 shows, however, that as of the end of 2005 their
net proﬁt and return on risk-weighted assets were still below Hong Kong
averages, although their net interest margin was higher than the Hong Kong
average.
20. He and Fan (2004).
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Table 4. Strategic Foreign Investments in the Big Five Banks, 2004–06
a
Share Value  of 
acquired deal  (billions  Date 
Bank Acquirer(s) (percent) of dollars) announced
ICBC Goldman Sachs, 10.0  3.8 January 2006
Allianz, and American Express
BOC Royal Bank of Scotland 5.16 1.6 August 2005
Merrill Lynch and 
Li Ka-shing Foundation 4.84 1.5
UBS 1.6 0.5 September 2005
CCB Bank of America 9.0 2.6 June 2005
Temasek 5.1 1.5 July 2005
BoCom HSBC 19.9 1.8 August 2004
Source: Ramos, Ma, and Meng (2006).
a. There were no foreign acquisitions of shares in ABC during this period.




Market holders’  market 
Bank capitalization Assets Loans Deposits equity (percent)
BoCom 25,988 170,130 95,204 148,955 9,611 4.0
CCB 86,921 554,679 305,036 482,578 35,926 13.1
China Merchants  9,786 89,519 57,281 78,345 3,180 2.1
Bank
Source: Ramos, Ma, and Meng (2006).
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This summary of recent developments in the banking system might
suggest that the banking system has turned a corner and is moving along
the road to modernization. Although we agree that much progress has
been made, we are skeptical that the reforms to date will sufﬁce to ensure
effective intermediation of Chinese savings. To see why further reform is
an imperative, it is necessary to review some additional history regarding
enterprise ﬁnancing and then to focus on distortions that remain in the
ﬁnancial system.
The previous NPL problems arose for two reasons. The ﬁrst was that
the government was committed to keeping ﬁnancing ﬂowing to provide
employment to people at money-losing enterprises. Chinese SOEs not
only were the main sources of employment in the economy, but also 
provided the social safety net. In the absence of institutions such as un-
employment insurance, pensions, and bankruptcy laws, reforms to SOEs
were executed in ways that minimized unemployment and potential insta-
bility. “Big bang” privatization might have increased the efﬁciency of SOEs
that survived in a more competitive environment, but at an unacceptable
social cost.
The second critical decision was that these de facto unemployment
payments were (after the mid-1980s) funneled through the banks. The
shift to directing credit through the banking system was made to move
losses off the treasury’s balance sheet, not because the banks were better
equipped to assess creditworthiness or monitor what was being done
with the money. The shift may well have been undertaken with little real-
ization of its possible incentive effects. In fact, it created at least two dis-
tortions: a moral hazard problem and a reduction of pressure from the
banks on the SOEs to improve their efficiency. The policy loans gutted
the banks’ profitability, but the banks ultimately were not accountable
for the losses. Thus they had little incentive to develop skills and exper-
tise in credit evaluation and as such were not prepared to be effective
intermediaries. We return to this point below when we assess the banks’
current competencies.
The SOEs faced little budget pressure and could operate under the
assumption that their losses would be tolerated. As noted by János Kornai,
Eric Maskin, and Gerard Roland, this arrangement of having weak-
performing state-owned banks lending to money-losing SOEs has often
Wendy Dobson and Anil K Kashyap 115
10269-03a_Dobson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 115appeared in command economies that attempted to liberalize.21 Edward
Steinfeld analyzes the associated problems in the Chinese context.
22 He
describes the interrelationships among governments, banks, and SOEs as
a “nested problem,” noting that a ﬁrm might lose money but still report
proﬁts, which serve as a source of tax revenue. Exacerbating and perpetu-
ating the problem are the soft loans available from the state-owned banks,
which themselves were periodically bailed out when bad loans surfaced.
“As long as the subsidization continues,” Steinfeld argues, “local agencies
can then engage in predatory taxation and managers can distort perfor-
mance data, all at no cost to the actors involved. The ﬁrm is kept aﬂoat from
outside, so it simply cannot go bankrupt.”
23
Numerous cross-country studies have found that, in countries with
government ownership of banks, the banks lend largely to SOEs, ﬁnancial
development is impeded, growth is relatively slow, and productivity is
depressed.
24 China started from such a low level of GDP that these prob-
lems have so far been possible to overlook.
25 But Gerard Caprio and Maria
Martinez Peria demonstrate that banking crises are more likely and their ﬁscal
costs higher when the government is the dominant owner of a country’s
banks.
26 The critical question regarding the long-run health of the banking
system and the success of the current reforms, therefore, is whether it is
likely that the burden and responsibility of policy lending will be decisively
lifted from the banks.
The fact that the Chinese government has shown no signs of relin-
quishing majority stakes in the banks is one indication that this remains
a risk. Indeed, an international comparison by the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development shows that China’s banking system
116 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
21. Kornai, Maskin, and Roland (2003).
22. Steinfeld (1998).
23. Steinfeld (1998, p. 46). In this respect the Chinese case appears to differ from other
transition economies, where the bad loans were often caused by what Akerlof and Romer
(1993) call “looting.” In our interviews and in the many articles studying the NPL problems
in China that we reviewed, we encountered no suggestion that this mechanism was an
important consideration.
24. One such study is La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002).
25. See also Allen, Qian, and Qian (2006), who emphasize that part of China’s rapid
growth has been possible through the development of many parallel channels of ﬁnancing
that circumvent the state-owned banks.
26. Caprio and Martinez Peria (2000).
10269-03a_Dobson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 116still has the highest share of government ownership (almost 100 per-
cent) in the world.
27 The pessimistic interpretation, that the government
is retaining ownership in order to preserve the option to direct credit, is
reinforced by the fact that the government has done little to promote
development of a bond market. Instead virtually all debt financing in
China is done through the banks; the Asian Development Bank notes
that corporate bond financing as of the end of 2005 stood at only 13 per-
cent of GDP, which by this metric makes China’s one of the least devel-
oped bond markets in Asia (far below Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand,
for instance).
28
The rest of this section analyzes other evidence suggesting that pres-
sures to preserve stability through misdirected lending remain, that the
recent declines in NPLs are likely masking some ongoing credit quality
problems, and that the banks lack risk management expertise to guard
against a sharp rise in loan losses. We begin with some aggregate trends
and then describe microeconomic data on bank lending practices; we con-
clude with some anecdotal evidence on management and regulatory prob-
lems in the banking sector.
Aggregate Indicators of Misdirected Bank Lending
At least three indicators suggest continued government inﬂuence on bank
operations: ongoing concern about absorbing surplus labor, high rates of
government and enterprise investment undertaken in part to create jobs,
and ongoing SOE restructuring.
Employment creation to absorb surplus labor is a major priority. Urban
job creation has managed to keep up with new entrants, migrants, and
layoffs from SOEs through flexible labor market policies, enterprise
transformation, remarkable openness to trade and direct investment, and
massive investment projects in manufacturing enterprises, infrastructure,
and real estate construction projects, particularly in the coastal provinces.
Wendy Dobson and Anil K Kashyap 117
27. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2005, p, 140).
28. Asian Development Bank (2006b, p. 5). The infrastructure to support a bond mar-
ket in China is a work in progress. Issuers still face numerous administrative restrictions,
while investors face a number of institutional and regulatory obstacles ranging from
nascent bankruptcy legislation and an underdeveloped credit rating system to inadequate
accounting and disclosure standards.
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gered in part because “the new leadership that assumed political power . . .
in 2002 appears determined to sustain China’s rapid economic growth,
and, if possible, to increase the pace of job creation compared to their pre-
decessors. They were strongly supported by local government and [Com-
munist] party ofﬁcials who shared these goals.”
29
But past efforts to preserve less productive jobs outside the urban areas
were so inadequate that the 11th Five Year Program now aims to redress
the imbalance in incomes and public services through enhanced public
services in rural areas and faster urbanization; the stated aim is to create
45 million urban jobs and transfer 45 million people from the rural areas.
30
Table 7 shows the divergent trends in incomes and consumption between
urban and rural areas.
The investment boom also stands out in the composition of economy-
wide spending (ﬁgure 1).
31 Investment grew at clearly unsustainable rates
of 34 percent in 2004 and 16 percent in 2005. This surge was accompa-
nied by a period of robust bank lending, with loan growth in excess of
15 percent between mid-2005 and mid-2006. By the end of the second quar-
ter of 2006, banks had already extended 87.2 percent of the loans called for
under the administrative guideline for the year. When the PBOC raised
reserve requirements in July 2006, the central bank stated that “China’s
economy still faces challenges from escalating ﬁxed asset investment and
118 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
29. Lardy (2004, p. 105).
30. Government of the People’s Republic of China (2006).
31. See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2005) for a comprehensive look at the imbalances in
China’s recent growth.
Table 7. Ratios of Urban to Rural Income and Consumption per Capita, Selected
Years, 1979–2003
Ratio of urban to  Ratio of urban to rural 





Source: Blanchard and Giavazzi (2005).
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Figure 1. Expenditure Composition of GDP in China, 1952–2005
excessive lending. The reserve ratio increase is meant to help curb growth
while still maintaining rapid but healthy economic expansion.”
32 Thus
in many respects we see the dynamic highlighted by Lardy playing out
again in 2006.
The aggregate implications are important: as the Asian Development
Bank points out, after the protracted rapid growth in investment the
economy is now faced with declining capital productivity.
33 Without
better allocation and efficiency of capital, even higher investment ratios
will be needed to ensure the capital accumulation required to create new
jobs. Evidence provided by Chang-Tai Hsieh and Peter Klenow sug-
gests that the SOEs are particularly unproductive.
34 They compare SOE
and non-SOE productivity (controlling for industry differences) and
find that, throughout the current decade, SOE productivity has been
roughly 30 percent lower than that of their privately owned competitors.
32. Quoted in “Central Bank Lifts Reserve Ratio,” Shanghai Daily Online, July 22, 2006.
33. Asian Development Bank (2006a, p. 123).
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the SOEs before that point.
Figure 2 provides additional evidence on the role of the public enter-
prises in the investment boom. The horizontal axis shows, for each of China’s
provinces, the output of the state-controlled enterprises (SOEs plus other
ﬁrms in which the government is a part owner with a controlling stake),
and the vertical axis plots each province’s investment in ﬁxed assets (both
measures expressed as shares of total provincial industrial output). It is
clear that the provinces where the government-afﬁliated ﬁrms dominate
production are also the ones that show the highest investment relative to
output.
35
The other relevant aggregate phenomenon is the ongoing restructuring of
industrial SOEs. Figure 3 measures the importance of the industrial SOEs
120 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
35. This ﬁnding by itself is open to a variety of interpretations that may or may not be
related to policy lending. In the next section we tie the SOE presence directly to bank lending.
Figure 2. Fixed Investment and SOE Industrial Output as Percent of Total Industrial
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results are striking in that they show that the number of industrial SOEs has
been pruned sharply, so that by mid-2006 they accounted for fewer than
10 percent of all industrial enterprises. This pruning has been tilted, however,
toward smaller ﬁrms. The share of total industrial enterprise assets residing
in the industrial SOEs stands at 48 percent. This means that the remaining
industrial SOEs are, on average, much larger than in the past: assets per
industrial SOE more than tripled between 1999 and mid-2006. An earlier
OECD study summarizes this shift up to 2003, showing that enterprises
then owned directly and indirectly by the state accounted for 60 percent of
industrial ﬁxed assets and 40 percent of industrial employees, but fewer
than 20 percent of total ﬁrms, and contributed 40 percent of value added.
36
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however, that the average contribution to value added masks large differences by sector.
Publicly owned ﬁrms in the utility and resource-based industries account for 75 percent of
value added in that sector, whereas in the rest of the industrial sector their contribution is
only 25 percent (p. 97).
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losses relative to losses for all industrial enterprises. For most of the time
since the data have been collected, the restructuring of the SOEs was work-
ing, in the sense that their share of losses was less than their share of assets.
But starting in 2005 that pattern has shifted. This is more clearly evident
in figure 4, which plots cumulative SOE losses relative to SOE assets in
each year. The industrial SOEs were steadily cutting their losses from
2000 through 2004, but that trend was broken in 2005 and 2006; the latter
year is on track to be the worst for the SOEs since the start of the decade.
Anecdotal evidence indicates some of the reasons and sectoral impacts. For
instance, on November 23, 2005, Xinhua Online reported marked drops in
2005 proﬁts for transportation equipment makers, building materials makers,
and oil processors due to higher energy costs. Steelmakers also faced cost
increases due to rising iron ore prices. Overall, according to government
ﬁgures,
37 roughly 40 percent of the industrial SOEs were losing money.
One potential contradiction of our reading of the evidence that losses at
government-controlled ﬁrms are mounting comes from data on aggregate
122 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
37. China Statistical Yearbook 2005, table 14-7.
Figure 4. Industrial SOE Losses as a Share of Assets, 1999–2006
Source: CEIC.
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10269-03a_Dobson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 122proﬁts reported by SOEs. These data have shown steady improvement
since the start of the decade and have risen sharply since 2005. However, it
appears that the surging proﬁts are highly concentrated within a relatively
few enterprises. For instance, Caijing magazine reports that, in 2005, the
ten largest SOEs (among the more than 120,000 SOEs recognized by the
National Bureau of Statistics) accounted for over 53 percent of total rev-
enue.
38 A February 2006 statement by the Chinese embassy in Washington
reported that, in 2005, SOEs owned by the central government accounted
for more than 70 percent of total SOE proﬁts.
39 Although comprehensive
data on firm-level borrowing are difficult to come by, it seems likely
that the most proﬁtable SOEs are ﬁnancing themselves primarily from
retained earnings rather than borrowing from banks. This would imply
that the banks’ exposure is concentrated on the less profitable SOEs and
other partially government controlled ﬁrms. One indication of this comes
from work in progress by David Dollar and Shang-Jin Wei.
40 They draw
on a World Bank survey of over 500 Chinese ﬁrms that includes informa-
tion on firms’ ownership and financing patterns for 2005. In this sample
SOEs are more reliant on bank ﬁnancing than non-SOEs, and SOEs that
have lower proﬁt rates are more bank dependent than SOEs with higher
proﬁt rates.
Direct Evidence on Bank Lending Behavior Since 2000
Other than noting that aggregate bank lending has soared since 2004,
we have sidestepped the role of banks in our discussion of macroeconomic
trends because, in the light of China’s robust economic growth, it would be
hard to use aggregate lending data to demonstrate convincingly that bank
lending has been misguided. We think, instead, that the efﬁciency of the
loans is better gauged using bank-level information. Three different types
of bank-level data point to impending problems with recent loans.
The ﬁrst, and least deﬁnitive, piece of evidence relates to the customer
mix of banks. As we established in the last section, China’s industrial SOEs
seem poised for another round of losses. The indirect evidence that we
have found suggests that the Big Five are still lending to many of the
same clients whose loans were written off in the earlier bank recapitaliza-
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38. Yuanyuan Hu, “Rule May See SOEs Add to Public Coffers,” China Daily, Septem-
ber 20, 2006 (www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-09/20/content_692703.htm).
39. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States (2006).
40. Dollar and Wei (2006).
10269-03a_Dobson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 123tions. We focus on the data for CCB, BOC, and BoCom since, by virtue of
their IPOs, they have had publicly available audited accounting information
for some time. Data for these three banks show that corporate customers still
account for 73, 77, and 78 percent of their total lending, respectively,
while retail customers’ loan shares are 19, 23, and 13 percent, respectively.
41
Loren Brandt and Xiaodong Zhu note the similarity in sectoral composi-
tion of the state-owned banks’ loan portfolios.
42 They also show that
although they and the joint stock banks are increasingly turning to retail
customers, their corporate customer shares are becoming increasingly con-
centrated in sectors such as housing, energy, and telecommunications—all
areas targeted by government policies—increasing the banks’ vulnerability
to sectoral shocks.
There are several hints that the banks’ current corporate customers
include many of the same companies that previously received policy
loans from the banks. The clearest hint is that, for each of these banks, the
percentage of loans that were more than ninety days past due increased
from 2004 to 2005.
43 Unless misdirected lending has continued, this is a
surprising result given that the economy has been booming over this
period and that each of the banks purports to have improved the quality of
its borrowers. Among these banks, only CCB breaks out its loans by the
legal form of the borrower: in the six months between December 2005
and June 2006, its loans to SOEs grew by 8.8 percent, while total lending
was up 14.5 percent. BoCom provides information on its ten largest bor-
rowers in its annual reports. Even as of December 31, 2005, ﬁve of the top
ten were identiﬁed as state owned, and four of these ﬁve SOEs in 2005
had an internal credit rating of 5 (on a 10-point scale), the lowest grade for
a performing loan. Brandt and Zhu examine the structure of bank lend-
ing over the 1998–2003 period and ﬁnd that the state sector, deﬁned to
include shareholding companies (in which governments have signifi-
cant ownership shares), continued to absorb between half and two-thirds
of new bank lending.
44 Finally, the World Bank’s most recent quarterly
124 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
41. CCB and BoCom 2005 annual reports, pp. 178 and 112, respectively; BOC June 2006
offering memorandum, p. 221.
42. Brandt and Zhu (forthcoming, pp. 35–36).
43. As we explain in the appendix, NPL data are not particularly helpful in judging the
contemporaneous quality of a bank’s loan portfolio, because judgment is involved in a
bank’s decision when to acknowledge a bad credit, and because the ultimate losses that the
bank will bear are often difﬁcult to determine.
44. Brandt and Zhu (forthcoming, p. 29).
10269-03a_Dobson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 124update on the Chinese economy reports on the rise and fall of banks’
“packaged loans” to companies owned by local governments, often for
infrastructure projects.
45 These loans increase the indebtedness of local
governments, which banks assume to be low risk and likely to be bailed
out by the central government if things go wrong. The popularity of these
loans forced the central government to issue a decree in April 2006 invali-
dating local government guarantees on such loans and calling on the banks
to cease granting them. We read all of this evidence as suggesting that a
great deal of business as usual has continued at the state-owned banks.
Several recent studies raise questions about the efﬁciency of the major
banks’ lending. Richard Podpiera analyzes the determinants of the growth
rate of loans for different types of banks by province and municipality for
the 1997–2004 period.
46 Two of his ﬁndings are relevant: ﬁrst, the prof-
itability of the state-owned banks’ corporate customers has no effect on
the growth of their loans; and second, the state-owned banks are losing
market share to other ﬁnancial institutions more quickly in those provinces
with the more proﬁtable corporate customers. Not only are the state-owned
banks underservicing non-state-owned corporate borrowers, such as small
and medium-size enterprises, which account for a majority of China’s
industrial production, but their existing customer base is being eroded by
more efﬁcient, smaller banks that are closer to those customers.
Provincial data conﬁrming the bias of bank lending toward SOEs are
presented in ﬁgure 5, which is inspired by a ﬁgure from Patrick Honohan.
47
As in ﬁgure 2, the horizontal axis plots provinces by the share of total
industrial output produced by the state-controlled ﬁrms. The variable on
the vertical axis is the ratio of Big Four bank lending in each province to total
provincial industrial output. Clearly, Big Four lending is higher relative to
industrial output in the provinces where the SOEs are dominant.
48 These data
are from 2003; more recent data are lacking because of lags in the availabil-
ity of the breakdown of output by province. However, both the loan shares
and the government shares of industrial production are extremely persis-
tent; the correlation of each of these variables from year to year is above
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46. Podpiera (2006).
47. Honohan (2004).
48. In ﬁgure 2 we showed that these provinces were also the ones that had the most
investment in ﬁxed assets. No doubt some of that investment is being ﬁnanced with retained
earnings, but ﬁgure 5 suggests that preferential lending is also likely to be important.
10269-03a_Dobson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 1250.99, and the cross-sectional pattern of loans through 2004 (the last year
for which full provincial lending data are available) looks similar to
those of previous years. So there is a strong presumption that the Big
Four are still directing their loans to those provinces inhabited largely by
government-controlled enterprises.
The suggestion that state-owned bank lending is governed by factors
other than the proﬁtability of the potential borrower is reinforced by the
results of two surveys using stratiﬁed national samples. Hongbin Li and
coauthors study the impact of Communist Party membership on a variety
of outcomes for a sample of over 3,200 private Chinese businesses in
2002.
49 They ﬁnd that businesses owned by Party members are signiﬁcantly
more likely to get loans from government ﬁnancial institutions. Chong-En
Bai, Jiangyong Lu, and Zhigang Tao study entrepreneurs’ attitudes regard-
ing the perceived difficulty of obtaining bank loans.
50 They find that,
among more than 2,800 private entrepreneurs surveyed in 2000, those
126 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
49. Li and others (2005).
50. Bai, Lu, and Tao (2006).
Figure 5. Total Loans and SOE Industrial Output as Percent of Total Industrial













10269-03a_Dobson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 126whose businesses were run by members of the Chinese People’s Congress
believed that access to bank credit was signiﬁcantly easier than did other
entrepreneurs.
Allen Berger, Iftekhar Hasan, and Mingming Zhou look at efﬁciency
taking a more structural approach.
51 They estimate a (translog) proﬁt
function that aims to gauge how close a given bank comes to maximizing
proﬁt given input prices (costs) and output prices. They ﬁnd a clear rank-
ing among different types of banks, with the Big Four far less efficient
than all the others. For instance, the Big Four earn about one quarter of the
profits that the most efficient bank in their sample would earn given the
Big Four’s cost and output mix. Unfortunately, these authors’ data end in
2003 and so do not help us gauge the effects of the most recent reforms.
Our ﬁnal indicator of bank inefﬁciency comes from a study of banks’
loan pricing patterns. Up until October 2004, loan pricing was tightly reg-
ulated, and banks’ loans were priced according to the government bench-
mark rates for the various maturities. Since then the banks have been
permitted to use their own judgment in setting lending rates, although
smaller banks still face some upper limits.
52 Table 8 compares the rates
offered by the state-owned banks with the government’s benchmark rate
since the deregulation. As expected, a break is evident at 2004:3, after
which many more loans are made above the benchmark, but subsequently
there has been little further change in the distribution of loans. Since the
benchmark rates themselves are rarely adjusted, this means that the range
of interest rates paid by borrowers is very compressed as well. From
October 2004 until April 2006, the indicative annual rate for loans of less
than six months was 5.22 percent; the rate on loans with maturities of over
ﬁve years was 6.12 percent. Thus, in the ﬁrst quarter of 2006, 96 percent
of all state-owned bank loans would have been priced at between 4.7 per-
cent and 8.0 percent. In contrast, data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey
of Terms of Business Lending for May 2006 indicate that interest rates on
U.S. banks’ loans with maturities of between two and thirty days ranged
from 4.54 to 6.88 percent. Given the shorter maturity of the U.S. loans
(and the presumably much higher credit quality of U.S. borrowers), this
comparison suggests that risk adjustment of their interest rates by Chinese
banks is still inadequate. Podpiera suggests that the reasons for the lack of
Wendy Dobson and Anil K Kashyap 127
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10269-03a_Dobson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 128differentiation by risk include the state-owned banks’ size and slowness
to change, a low priority for differentiation when liquidity is so abundant,
and a reluctance to price for risk if it means imposing higher charges on
their weakest customers.
53
Table 9 shows the dispersion of lending rates for other types of ﬁnan-
cial institutions in China in 2005:4 and 2006:1. Compression in lending is
evident for all types, but the regional commercial banks and the credit
cooperatives are much more likely to charge rates above the benchmark.
In summary, the evidence on bank lending behavior patterns reinforces
the message of the aggregate statistics. Massive investment supported by
healthy retained earnings and rapid loan growth are likely leading, as they
do elsewhere, to declining marginal productivity of capital. Rapid loan
growth is not necessarily an indication of healthy lending practices by the
banks. Rather it appears that distortions produced by policy lending per-
sist. Speciﬁcally, the Big Five banks show few signs of properly account-
ing for credit risk in the pricing of their loans, and they continue to show
a substantial bias toward lending to state-owned and politically connected
borrowers.
Anecdotal Evidence on Bank Management and Regulation
In addition to the data on recent bank lending patterns, we have found
much anecdotal evidence suggesting that bank credit is still being mis-
directed. Again, these examples should be viewed against the backdrop of
marked improvements in overall bank performance over the past half
decade. Most of these anecdotes involve distortions brought on by gov-
ernment interference. But we ﬁnd it useful to separate the fallout into its
effects on the qualiﬁcations of senior personnel, the impact on regulation,
and the implications for risk management.
Reports of government meddling are widespread. As noted earlier,
continued government involvement in the Big Four’s governance (through
government directors on their boards and Party appointees among senior
managers) undermines their independence. By itself this contributes to
moral hazard, as depositors believe they have blanket protection of their
deposits; investors are among the optimists who believe the government will
use its resources to cover losses. Some reports indicate that the government
Wendy Dobson and Anil K Kashyap 129
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10269-03a_Dobson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 130intends to introduce deposit insurance, but no date has been set. More-
over, even if the formal rules change, it remains to be seen whether depos-
itors would actually be forced to bear losses should a bank fail.
Beyond any conceptual problems arising from the government’s domi-
nation of the banks are the follow-on effects that such domination has on
the quality of bank management. Well-functioning banking systems are
predicated on a governance framework that creates accountability at the
very top of the organization: a board of directors made up largely of expe-
rienced people from the private sector who are not associated with the
bank as customers or suppliers, and whose primary responsibility is to
ensure that management’s interests and the strategy for which manage-
ment is responsible are aligned with shareholders’ interests. The Big Five
(except for ABC) have changed their ownership structures to include
strategic and public investors, but although the impact on performance is
beginning to be felt, the impact on governance is small for at least two
reasons. First, the boards of directors are new, and it takes time for them
to function as a cohesive team. Second, and more important, these investors
are outnumbered by the government appointees, who, like the board chairs
and CEOs, are members of the Party. As Barry Naughton notes,
54 the
CEOs of all the Big Four are members or alternates of the Central Com-
mittee. Pure technocrats are not running the banks. Instead bank managers
are also Party loyalists, who may have little commercial banking exper-
tise and have their own agenda that is likely to conﬂict with the principles
of sound banking.
These problems can be seen at the boards of BOC and CCB. These
boards include seven directors appointed by the China State Administration
of Foreign Exchange Investments, as the major shareholder, three from
management (the bank governor and two deputy governors), three to five
independent directors, and possibly two directors from strategic investors.
Xie Ping reports that “among the directors only 4 of them will also be
member of the Communist Party Committee . . . which include the chairman,
governor and two deputy governors—i.e., they will be minority [sic].”
55 Yet
the CEO is often also the bank’s Party secretary, and bank strategy and per-
formance are discussed at Party meetings. Our interviews with independent
Wendy Dobson and Anil K Kashyap 131
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55. Xie Ping, “China’s Banking Reform,” Asian Daily (Credit Suisse First Boston),
April 25, 2005.
10269-03a_Dobson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 131foreign directors and senior managers installed by strategic investors sug-
gest that these outside experts ﬁnd themselves hampered by the parallel
political structures. One manager, for example, pointed out the anomaly of
performance and strategic issues being discussed separately at Party meet-
ings and by the board. In another example, a senior manager recruited from
abroad arrived at work one day to find the ranks of employees in his
department seriously depleted; he was only then informed that they had
been sent to Party School for the day. An independent director also sum-
marized the revealed role of that position as one of adviser to management,
but without management being accountable to the board in the increas-
ingly formalized way that characterizes international best practice. Given
these reported problems, it is striking that the memoranda accompanying
the IPOs of both CCB and BOC, despite their extensive discussion of the
risks facing the banks, include no discussion whatsoever of the potential
problems stemming from Party interference.
Politicization also inﬂuences the regulatory process. Victor Shih notes,
“Because these institutions are either wholly or partially state-owned,
they have Communist Party committees with propaganda, organization,
and discipline and inspection subcommittees. In addition to reporting to
the party secretary of the institution, who often serves concurrently as the
chairman of the board, the discipline and inspection committee reports 
to the Party DIC [Disciplinary and Inspection Committee] at a higher
level....   Because of the existence of a wide array of monitoring institu-
tions, the CBRC [China Banking Regulatory Commission] merely con-
trols the most technical and in some ways least important aspects of
ﬁnancial supervision.”
56 Shih also reports that the CBRC has threatened
that top jobs will be jeopardized if NPL ratios begin to rise again. If true,
such admonitions suggest the replacement of directed lending by directed
management, which is likely to lead to distortions and misreporting to
avoid the consequences of bad news.
Finally, the banks’ political origins continue to affect their ability to
modernize their reporting and risk management systems. In interviews,
bank ofﬁcials describe the banks as “holding companies” with separate
legacy organizations for each province, each with its own information and
human resource systems and power base. Consolidated information with
132 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
56. Victor Shih, “China’s Uphill Battle for Stronger Banks,” Far Eastern Economic
Review, November 2005, p. 40.
10269-03a_Dobson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 132which to assess a customer’s creditworthiness often does not exist. Recent
loan scandals at ABC indicate both fraudulent loans and underreporting
of NPLs. Oxford Analytica summarizes ABC’s management response as
substituting investment in government treasury bonds and the interbank
market in order to reduce credit risk.
57 Matthias Bekier, Richard Hwang,
and Gregory Wilson report that “When [one] major bank reviewed 60 per-
cent of its lending in one region, for example, it couldn’t determine which
industry had received a given loan, what type of collateral was provided
for it, or even who had made the lending decision.”
58
Indeed, in the present environment it is easier for the state-owned banks
not to make new loans, as demonstrated most recently by the shift in ABC’s
investment strategy. One of our interviewees put it well when describing
the mentality of branch managers that contributes to a preference for corpo-
rate loans to industrial SOEs: “If I lend money to a SOE and it defaults, 
I will not be blamed. But if I make a loan to a privately-owned shoe factory
and it defaults, I will be blamed.” Directed management contributes to the
problem: the regulator’s priority is to reduce NPL ratios; little is said about
how proﬁtability targets might be achieved. In addition, although employ-
ment by the banks has declined as far-ﬂung branches have been closed, our
interviews with senior bank ofﬁcials and analysts revealed that the Big Four
face strong pressures to retain employees even though they lack the experi-
ence and skills required now that the banks are expected to operate as mod-
ern banks rather than as government departments handing out working
capital.
59 The banks, with the assistance of the CBRC and their strategic
partners, have organized a major retraining effort, but unless the retrained
employees return to a different incentive structure at the branch level, such
training will have little impact on their behavior.
Remarks attributed to CCB Chairman Shuqing Guo in June 2006
reinforce this point. He was reported to have told an academic forum “that
the banks were still prone to being invited in by authorities for a ‘cup of
coffee’ to discuss lending policy.”
60 Managers we interviewed stated that
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10269-03a_Dobson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 133they are centralizing credit decisions to reduce such pressures. The data in
ﬁgure 5 suggest that such centralization will be extremely difﬁcult, but, to
the extent it is occurring, the survey evidence cited earlier suggests that
it may come at the expense of higher-risk, little-known entrepreneurial
enterprises, which are emerging throughout the country but whose growth
is being constrained by lack of access to funding.
61
Overall, anecdotal evidence conﬁrms the impressions left by the micro-
economic and macroeconomic data that, despite the progress that has
accompanied the recent reforms, the long-term proﬁtability of the state-
owned banks is far from secure. Therefore we next brieﬂy review the risks
associated with the continuation of the current policies that derive from the
ofﬁcial preference for gradual and controlled change.
The Risks Ahead
The logic of the preceding analysis suggests that many of the loans
granted after the 2004–05 capital injections are poised to go bad. This
conclusion raises two further questions. First, can we make any informed
guesses about what might trigger the recognition of such losses? Second,
can we say anything about the size of those losses? We tackle these ques-
tions in turn.
Both the 1999 and the 2004–05 bailouts were motivated at least in part
by liberalization commitments made in the context of negotiating China’s
entry into the WTO. But macroeconomic factors also played a role, in that
denying problems became less tenable once China’s growth slowed in the
wake of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. This leads us to consider separately the
role of foreign entry and a possible macroeconomic downturn as potential
triggers.
Foreign Competition
When the domestic banking market opens to foreigners in 2007, how
signiﬁcant will the resulting competitive pressures be? It seems unlikely
that this competition will force the large state-owned banks to recognize
any hidden NPLs, for two reasons.
134 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
61. This point was emphasized in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
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Big Five for much lending business. When the world’s megabanks enter
new markets, they tend to focus on high-margin activities rather than
commodity products and activities. Foreign banks generally view China
as attractive because they see customers being underserved and many
standard products absent. Brian Metcalfe surveyed thirty-five major for-
eign banks operating in China and found that the majority of their lending
was to non-Chinese customers; only two of the thirty-ﬁve had issued more
than 40 percent of their loans to Chinese ﬁrms.
62 Moreover, when asked
about how they saw the market developing, the banks ranked credit
cards, mortgages, and investment products as the product areas they see
“as  becoming increasingly important in the Chinese retail banking
industry in the next three years.” On the wholesale banking side, they
identified debt capital markets, credit derivatives, and structured prod-
ucts and risk management as the three growth areas. These findings,
echoed in our interviews, suggest that the foreign banks seem to have
little interest in battling the Big Five for lending share. If this is true,
then almost by definition the extra competition is unlikely to have impli-
cations for the state-owned banks’ NPLs.
A possible indirect mechanism for increased competition would be for-
eign entry leading to large deposit outflows from the domestic banks,
in turn forcing the domestic banks to adjust their lending practices. We
doubt this is likely. One reason is that, in other countries where foreign
bank entry has played out (such as Japan), there is little evidence that
domestic savers quickly move their deposits to new entrants. Indeed, most
residents are slow to change their behavior and switch banks. Chinese
savers have long lacked both choice and ﬁnancial experience; hence we
expect the same pattern to prevail in China as in other countries. Another
reason is that there is little evidence of foreign entrants planning to build (or
acquire) the branch infrastructure necessary to pursue a strategy of aggres-
sive deposit seeking.
If foreign banks do focus on other products and services, the result will
be that the Big Five will lag the foreigners in providing these services and
products. Is this even a cost to the Big Five? We think not. The reason
they do not currently offer the products and services highlighted in the
Metcalfe survey is that they lack the expertise to do so. The foreign banks
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with some of these products and by creating standards; in other words, the
Big Five could be better off letting foreigners set up the credit derivatives
market before they themselves enter, rather than trying to trail blaze.
Together these reasons suggest that opening up to foreign competition
is unlikely to be a trigger for the surfacing of more NPLs.
Macroeconomic Slowdown
In contrast to the likely benign effect of additional competition, we expect
the condition of the macroeconomy to be a major risk for the state-owned
banks. We, along with many others who are worried about a slowdown over
the next few years, point to two critical factors.
The ﬁrst is the unbalanced nature of recent economic growth. As men-
tioned earlier, the current expansion has been fueled by an unprecedented
surge in ﬁxed investment, funded in part by bank loans. Weak governance
is also a factor. State-dominated companies have faced little pressure to
pay dividends to the government and thus can recycle retained earnings to
ﬁnance more investment.
63 Importantly, this additional investment does
not have to earn a rate of return that exceeds the cost of capital that a pri-
vate sector ﬁrm might use to assess project risk.
64
This conﬂuence of factors encouraging overinvestment is creating many
pockets of excess capacity. As the Asian Development Bank notes, “steel
capacity, for example, is already 120 million tons greater than demand,
but capacity of an additional 70 million tons is being built. In addition,
more than a quarter of the nation’s 10.3 million tons of aluminum capacity
was idle in early 2006.”
65 Therefore it is hardly surprising that the Bank
for International Settlements, in its discussion of the risks of a Chinese
slowdown to global stability, writes, “In China, the principal concern must
be that misallocated capital will eventually manifest itself in falling proﬁts,
and that this will feed back on the banking system, the ﬁscal authorities
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fuelled expansion, this would be the classic denouement.”
66 Even the high-
est levels of the Chinese government seem to be aware of these risks. In
late July China’s top leaders took the unusual step of warning publicly
that the economy was at risk of overheating.
67
The second factor that concerns us is the policy response to these
risks. The orthodox macroeconomic policy response would be to cut any
government-sponsored investment spending and raise interest rates. Rob
Subbaraman and Paul Sheard concisely describe the actual policy mix:
“China’s policymakers are implementing another round of tightening
measures, but we question the approach. Most measures rely on adminis-
trative ﬁat: 100 bp [basis points] of hikes in the bank reserve requirement
ratio, tighter controls in the property market and moral suasion on local
governments and banks to restrict land development and curb credit.
There has been only a token 27bp interest rate hike. The government tried
such administrative measures in 2004–5. They worked for a while, but
ultimately failed. We see little reason why they should work this time,
given that the economy has become more market-oriented.”
68 We agree
with this assessment, and one early conﬁrmation is PBOC’s further increase
in reserve requirements in November 2006.
The government is hesitant to raise interest rates because it fears that
doing so would trigger an inﬂow of funds from abroad and leave credit
conditions no tighter. Currency appreciation would partly offset this effect,
but that option would slow export growth and, in those sectors with over-
capacity, further reduce proﬁts. For these sectors, engineering a soft landing
looks difﬁcult.
In a market-based economy, the goal of profit maximization would
naturally deter bank borrowing to support continued investment in the
sectors with excess capacity. Speciﬁcally, the capacity overhang would
deter ﬁrms from further investing. Moreover, those ﬁrms that did seek
bank ﬁnancing would face increased borrowing rates in light of the risks.
As shown earlier, however, loan pricing in China remains quite uniform,
and so credit costs are not a stabilizing factor.
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nance and by the perverse incentives provided by many local governments.
The Asian Development Bank summarizes the situation as follows: “Local
governments, which control 70 percent of ﬁscal spending, also contribute to
the investment drive by spending on new factories and ‘trophy’ projects in
their areas, often regardless of whether expansion is warranted on economic
grounds. Incentives and rewards at [the] local government level are still
often linked to physical growth targets rather than to more meaningful eco-
nomic and social objectives.”
69 Through mid-2006, investment spending by
local governments was up 31 percent—a growth rate 2.5 percentage points
higher than that of a year earlier.
70 Ongoing pressures to absorb surplus
labor suggest that this may be difﬁcult to cut back.
In light of all these factors, we see a substantial risk of a sharp economy-
wide slowdown at some point in the next several years. Subbaraman and
Sheard estimate that there is “a 1-in-3 chance of China’s GDP growth
slowing to 5% or lower in the next three years.”
71 What would such a
slowdown mean for the state-owned banks? There are several ways to
estimate the impact. We sketch two of these, both of which suggest that
the losses could be on the same order of magnitude as the 1999 bailout.
One estimation method focuses on inferring bank losses by forecasting
the effects of a macroeconomic slowdown on borrowers’ performance.
Standard & Poor’s has done a static calculation of how abrupt changes in
interest rates or the exchange rate would alter Chinese ﬁrms’ ability to ser-
vice their debt.
72 In these calculations, rising interest rates raise required
interest payments, and an appreciation of the yuan lowers sales and earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). For illus-
trative purposes Standard & Poor’s assumes that if EBITDA falls below
the required interest payments, the borrower will default. Among the various
scenarios considered, one presumes a 200-basis-point increase in interest
rates and a 25 percent nominal appreciation against the dollar. In this case,
net proﬁts decline by 34 percent and new NPLs of 1.7 trillion yuan result.
The proﬁt drop, if anything, seems modest in the event of a hard landing,
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70. “Is China’s 10.9% Growth Rate Overheating?” People’s Daily Online, July 22,
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72. Standard & Poor’s (2006).
10269-03a_Dobson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 138since this calculation ignores the dynamic effects of the interest rate spike.
73
Even so, the resulting NPLs would be similar in magnitude to the 1.4 tril-
lion yuan of NPLs that were moved to the AMCs in 1999. However, since
China’s GDP more than doubled between 1999 and 2005, this would be a
smaller bailout relative to the size of the economy.
An alternative approach is to estimate losses directly, using the loan rating
classiﬁcations of the banks. Table 10 shows the distribution of loans accord-
ing to the Bank for International Settlements’ ﬁve-category classiﬁcation
scheme for the Big Five. For BOC, BoCom, ICBC, and CCB, roughly
12.1 percent of loans are in the special mention category. In principle, these
loans are still performing, but they have been separated out because they
are at risk of becoming nonperforming. It has been reported that a senior
risk advisor at CCB alleges that many loans that were in fact not performing
were being hidden by classifying them in the special mention category.
74
The report also quotes a ratings analyst at Fitch as saying that “A lot of
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Table 10. Quality Distribution of Loans of the Big Five Banks, December 2005
Percent of total
Loan category ABC ICBC CCB BOCa BoCom Averageb
Healthy n.a. 86.1 84.4 79.5 85.5 83.9
Special mention n.a. 9.2 11.8 15.1 12.1 12.1
Substandard n.a. 2.8 1.7 2.4 1.3 2.0
Doubtful n.a. 1.7 1.8 2.4 1.0 1.7
Unrecoverable n.a. 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.05 0.3






Total value of 
loans (billions of yuan) 2,829.3 3,289.6 2,458.4 1,800.1 763.2 11,140.6
d
Sources: tables 2 and 3 and BoCom, BOC, ICBC, and CCB 2005 annual reports.
a. Domestic loans only.
b. Simple (not loan-weighted) averages, excluding ABC except where noted.
c. Rows may not sum to totals because of rounding.
d. Includes ABC.
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down in activity would almost certainly push these loans over the edge;
indeed, for this very reason Standard & Poor’s routinely counts the special
mention loans as impaired assets. At the end of 2005, loans outstanding in the
Big Five totaled 11.14 trillion yuan, which implies NPLs of 1.35 trillion yuan.
Given the rough nature of these calculations, we take some comfort in
the fact that they turn up fairly similar estimates. To put them in perspec-
tive, suppose that the slowdown happens in the latter half of 2007. By that
time the economy will have grown so that an NPL write-off of 1.52 tril-
lion yuan (the average of the two estimates) would be about 7.1 percent of
GDP.
75 Measured against cumulative growth between 2004 and the time
of the slowdown, this seems to be a manageable liability; essentially it
would mean that about 1.8 percent (= 7.2 ÷ 4) of each year’s growth was
“paid for” with loans that wind up going bad. Our sense is that although
these losses would be substantial in absolute terms, they would be afford-
able and perhaps even an acceptable price to the government if viewed as
the cost of maintaining economic stability.
76
Two Alternatives
The preceding discussion illustrates the costs of continuing to ignore the
inherent tension between freeing the banks to make commercial decisions
and continuing to steer policy loans through the banks to maintain social
stability. Our estimates of the costs suggest that China can afford to con-
tinue the current policies. We ﬁnd it difﬁcult, however, to stop there. There
may not be a systemic risk, but there will be an opportunity cost to the pub-
lic funds inevitably allocated to the bailout. With better policies, these funds
could be productively used to fund the goals of the 11th Five Year Program
for more balanced growth.
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embraced by economists: if the government is going to subsidize or tax an
activity, then the tax or subsidy should be applied as directly as possible
to that activity; indirect taxes and subsidies lead to unintended distor-
tions. In this case, moral hazard is an obvious problem. But we have also
explained how leaving the banks with a dual mandate is impairing bank
regulation, the quality of bank management, and the modernization of risk
management and other management information systems. These distor-
tions degrade the efﬁciency of intermediation in China.
Accordingly, the ﬁrst, and most important, component of our alterna-
tive vision for banking reform is to move ongoing policy lending to the
policy banks. Doing so may or may not reduce the moral hazard, because
the policy banks may or may not face a hard budget constraint. So, under
our proposal, the level of continued policy lending would be a choice left
up to the Communist Party.
The main beneﬁt from deﬁnitively transferring the burden of policy
lending to the policy banks would instead be to eliminate the other distor-
tions involving management, regulation, and reporting systems. More-
over, consolidating the policy lending would make it easier for the central
government to monitor the level of lending; the policy banks are special-
ized and, by virtue of not having profits from other activities, could not
divert those profits to extend additional loans. Therefore, if a decision
were made to rein in policy lending, it would be more likely to succeed if
policy lending were limited to the policy banks.
The two alternatives that we explore therefore differ mainly in two
respects. One regards the transition by which the policy loans would be
migrated away from the Big Five to the policy banks. The other pertains
to the implicit judgment about the general quality of the existing person-
nel, and speciﬁcally about their ability to evaluate loan requests.
Good Banks and Bad Banks
The current strategy of offloading NPLs to AMCs is a variant of the
“good bank, bad bank” model used in Japan after World War II and in a
variety of Western banks to clean up NPL portfolios following banking
crises.
77 In this model, bad loans are isolated into a business within the
Wendy Dobson and Anil K Kashyap 141
77. See Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) for a summary of the Japanese experience.
10269-03a_Dobson-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 141bank according to clear principles. First, the loans are assigned to a “bad
bank” that is separated from the rest of the organization, and particularly
from those bank ofﬁcials who made the loans and formed the customer
relationships. The borrowers of these loans become ineligible for new
loans or special treatment from the other, “good” side of the bank. Sec-
ond, an excellent business manager is given authority to make all deci-
sions, from initial appraisal of each asset’s breakeven point to decisions
about whether to write off the credit, merge it with other assets, or work it
out. The manager’s authority should include direct access to and the sup-
port of the CEO and the board of directors. Third, the bad bank is given
stature within the organization: not only does it receive its share of senior
management time, but every person in the organization is given a clear
career path beyond the time when the bad loans have been disposed of (thus
encouraging them to focus on the job at hand without worrying about their
own future advancement). Fourth, the managers are given leeway to under-
take hands-on management, traveling if necessary to monitor progress and
effectively manage the assets. Finally, the assets in the bad bank are subject
to transparent reporting and monitoring by stakeholders with respect to the
magnitude of the original problem, followed by regular public reports on
progress in recovering or otherwise disposing of the portfolio.
The AMC route probably made sense in China in 1999 when the remark-
able magnitude of the state-owned banks’ bad loans became apparent.
The AMCs are notionally obliged to ofﬂoad all NPLs by December 2006,
when the banking sector is scheduled to open to foreign competition under
the WTO accession agreement. But, as discussed in the appendix, their
performance is fraught with problems and it looks highly unlikely that
they will have done so. Their targets contain an inherent contradiction in
incentives: their staff are expected to work themselves out of a job. When
there are no apparent rewards for success and there is no strategy for re-
deploying staff at the end of the process, the focus on the business at hand
becomes blurred by questions about “what will happen to me?” Thus
progress in clearing the bad loans has been slow, and new ones have
appeared in both the AMCs and the banks. Indeed, the AMCs are consid-
ered to be close to insolvency themselves.
78
Another problem for the Chinese AMCs is that they are reluctant to use
public auction bids as indicators of fair market value for fear of being
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78. Rodman (2005a).
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similar to the various AMCs that have operated with limited success in
Japan since the mid-1990s.
79 Through 2005, China had conducted no more
than ﬁve open auctions.
80 In Taiwan, the number of privately negotiated
dispositions has been signiﬁcant, but the largest share of total sales has
taken place by public auction.
South Korea, in contrast to both Taiwan and China, has been much
more aggressive: it has written off, or resolved through bank merger or
closure, more than 60 percent of the NPLs that appeared during its 1998
banking crisis. Its banking system is now considered to have successfully
made the transition to restored health. Daniela Klingebiel studied seven
other country episodes and concluded that the contrast between the Korean
and Chinese experiences with AMCs reﬂects outcomes commonly observed
elsewhere.
81 In a majority of the cases she studied, these vehicles did not
succeed in meeting their objectives. Moreover, in the two most clearly
successful examples (the Resolution Trust Corporation in the United
States and the Swedish restructuring organizations), both actively disposed
of their assets.
82
In sum, we think the Chinese state-owned banks should be restructured
to segregate within the banks the new NPLs that have emerged since
1999, giving stature to the “bad bank” and stafﬁng it with excellent man-
agement dedicated to resolving the NPL problems, and ensuring that these
customers do not receive new loans or special consideration from the
other, “good” side of the original bank. The shareholders in the existing
entity could receive pro rata shares in both entities. The government
would then have to decide whether the policy banks would step in to provide
additional ﬁnancing.
Under this model, the performing nonpolicy loans would be transferred
to the good bank. This bank would have the objectives that are currently
mandated for the Big Five (but that we believe are unattainable given the
mixed mandate that they are being asked to fulﬁll). For this model to suc-
ceed, it is imperative that the Big Five have enough competent personnel
to operate their good banks successfully. The remaining staff would be
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credit evaluation and risk management. Freed from the burden of the policy
loans, the remaining bank operations would ﬁnd their transparency greatly
enhanced. The unambiguous mandate for the good bank would also alleviate
many of the problems mentioned in our interviews and reported by analysts
and journalists; particularly for the current foreign partners and other poten-
tial partners, the clariﬁcation of the mandate should make the implementa-
tion of modern management practices much easier.
We recognize that the good bank would face many hurdles, not the
least of which is that its personnel would be drawn from the existing bank
staff. Another problem, which Honohan brieﬂy notes in discussing a close
variant of this proposal, is that this type of reorganization has “not attracted
a champion in the Chinese administration.”
83 These challenges are sufﬁ-
ciently formidable that we are not conﬁdent that they can be overcome.
But we do believe that a more focused good bank would have a much
greater chance of achieving the objectives than the existing banks under
their current structure.
Narrow Banks
Because of our concerns about the difficulty of ever overcoming the
legacy problems at the state-owned banks, we consider an alternative that
would separate the deposit taking and lending functions of the Big Five
and turn the latter over to other entities, thus transforming the Big Five
into “narrow banks.”
84 This alternative would then squarely shift the bur-
den of the continuation of the policy loans to the policy banks. Given that
roughly half of all Big Five loans have a maturity of under one year, once
a decision to proceed was made, it would be possible to migrate the non-
policy loans to other institutions. Smaller domestic banks and foreign
institutions would take over the lending functions. Other institutions would
have a strong incentive to partner with the Big Five, to gather additional
information on these nonpolicy loans in order to decide which ones to try
to take over.
From the perspective of their depositors, the Big Five would look
largely unchanged. Their extensive branch networks would be preserved,
and the staff working on the deposit-taking side of the business would be
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low-risk, low-yielding assets, including mutual funds that might include
securitized pools of loans.
85 The limits on the range of investment options
would further increase the banks’ attractiveness as organizations for other
banks and ﬁnancial services companies to partner with. The experience of
Japan Post (the soon-to-be-privatized post ofﬁce in Japan that also offers
savings accounts) in ﬁnding partners suggests that partnerships are possible.
Conclusions
We have presented a skeptical appraisal of China’s gradualist banking
reforms. Substantial progress has been made in the past few years, but the ten-
sions between banking efﬁciency and social stability persist and contribute to
the distortions we have discussed. We are not arguing for a “big bang” or for
privatization. Rather we support gradualism with more realism. The world’s
best commercial banks use market principles to evaluate and manage the mul-
titude of risks they face; their credit decisions are independent of political
considerations and personal connections. If the Chinese government wishes
to retain majority ownership at this stage of the ﬁnancial system’s develop-
ment, its expectation that the Big Five banks will behave like commercial
banks is likely to be disappointed. These banks are likely to be inefﬁcient,
low-margin, slow-growth businesses that will lose market share to the smaller
banks, whose ownership and employment contributions are of less interest
to the authorities.
86 When economic growth inevitably slows, the ensuing
bailout, while affordable, will divert public funds from other priorities such as
those under the 11th Five Year Program to enhance public services in rural
areas and accelerate urbanization. Our proposals for a “good bank, bad bank”
approach or a narrow banking approach (the latter has been raised in discus-
sions of the new Postal Savings Bank) are alternatives that would reconcile
the government’s contradictory goals of efﬁciency and stability.
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Interpreting China’s Nonperforming Loans
THE STATISTICS ON bad loans in the Big Four are subject to various inter-
pretations; hence a range of ﬁgures are quoted for any particular statistic.
One overarching problem is that some loans may be neither fully repaid
nor fully defaulted upon; rather, some fraction of the loan will be col-
lected. For almost all purposes, therefore, the relevant ﬁgure is not simply
total loans scheduled to be repaid, but instead the difference between this
ﬁgure and what will be ultimately collected. This difference represents
both the taxpayer exposure and the size of the capital injection that will be
needed to make the banks solvent (although even more money would be
required to comply with international minimum capital requirements). As
a rule, the highest estimates for bad loans presume that nothing will be
collected and thus systematically overstate the ultimate losses.
This problem is compounded by the subtleties of systems used to clas-
sify loans that are at risk of not being repaid. In January 2002 the CBRC’s
predecessor organization adopted the Bank for International Settlements’
ﬁve-category loan rating system. Under this system, banks identify, in the
ﬁrst two categories, healthy loans and loans that are performing but are at
risk and hence potentially require special mention. The ofﬁcial guidelines
suggest that, for these “special mention” loans, borrowers are expected to
be able to service the loans currently, but repayment may be adversely
affected by speciﬁc factors. In practice, however, these loans can be past
due for up to ninety days.
87 The remaining three categories of loans are
nonperforming: they include those that are merely substandard in quality,
those whose collection is acknowledged to be doubtful, and those that are
deemed unrecoverable. In principle, these distinctions are supposed to
reﬂect expected recovery rates, but banks have considerable discretion in
the extent to which they recognize the problems and put loans into the two
worst categories.
This discretion makes it difficult to compare these three categories
across banks and leads most analysts to aggregate all three categories
into a catchall NPL category. This aggregation in turn further compli-
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agree on a speciﬁc estimate for a bank’s NPLs, the implied ultimate losses
could differ if the mix of substandard, doubtful, and unrecoverable loans
differs. Conversely, two different estimates for total NPLs could imply
the same ultimate losses.
As mentioned in the text, the NPLs that were removed from the books
of the state-owned banks in 1999 were transferred to AMCs, which were
then charged with disposing of the loans. The bookkeeping regarding these
transactions is complicated and can easily lead to confusion about ultimate
recovery levels. Four AMCs (Cinda, Huarong, Great Wall, and Orient)
took loans worth $168 billion off the books of the Big Four.
88 The AMCs
acquired these loans at book value and then either sold them, recovered the
assets through workouts, or arranged debt-equity swaps. Unfortunately,
there is no uniﬁed public record offering details of the different transactions,
and therefore the ultimate recovery rate cannot be precisely estimated.
Available estimates suggest recovery rates of between 10 and 30 percent,
centering around 20 percent.
89 John Caparusso suggests that “‘rules of
thumb’ on bad debt recoveries based on AMC experience are: expect 5%
recovery rate on Category 5 (loss), 35% on Category 4 (doubtful) and 60%
on Category 3 (sub-standard).”
90
What is known is that the efﬁciency of these AMCs in dealing with
legacy loans has been low. A June 2005 report by the National Audit
Ofﬁce gave “details of $8.6 billion misused by the debt-clearing agencies
at the forefront of China’s banking reforms.”
91 The Ministry of Finance
was criticized for opacity in how its funds are used. The audit office
found, among other irregularities, thousands of ﬁctional employees on the
AMCs’ payrolls.
The second round of recapitalizations, which started in 2004, was done
slightly differently. Initially, the PBOC used foreign exchange reserves
(in the form of U.S. Treasury bonds) to establish a new subsidiary, the
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acquire the loans from the two banks in return for an equity stake. Accord-
ing to Caparusso, the loans this time were transferred at prices below
book value and then auctioned to the AMCs at a further discount; the trans-
fer prices and discounts varied depending on the ratings of the loans, but a
conservative estimate for total losses on these loans would be 70 percent,
with an upper bound of as much as 90 percent.
93
We draw two main conclusions from the experience to date. First,
even under the new Bank for International Settlements standards for clas-
sifying loans, the banks retain considerable discretion in how loans are iden-
tiﬁed. Second, because of this discretion, one has to be careful in comparing
different estimates for NPLs, since some estimates need not correspond to
the ultimate losses associated with the loans. As we explain in the text, we
can nonetheless say that through 2005 it looks like the cleanup of policy
lending since 1998 has cost at least $240 billion. Others have estimated the
losses at more than $505 billion for the entire banking system.
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92. The company, also known as China State Administration of Foreign Exchange
(SAFE) Investments, was formed in late 2003 as a holding company for the state’s stakes in
the state-owned banks. After its purchase of major shareholdings in these two institutions,
Huijin assigned six directors to BOC and four to CCB. Its mission is described as that of a
“visible hand” promoting bank reform and ensuring that stockholders obtain “competitive
investment return and dividend proceeds . . . and . . . establish a sound corporate gover-
nance structure” (“Economy: With Xie Ping’s Steering, the Central Huijin Company Turns
to Be Solid,” Economic Observer, September 27, 2004; en.eeo.com.cn/readnews.asp?
ID=249).
93. Caparusso (2004).
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Comments and 
Discussion
Nicholas Lardy: My comments on this paper by Wendy Dobson and Anil
Kashyap fall into three broad areas: the political economy of bank lending,
the measurement of policy lending, and the cost of bank recapitalization.
The political economy of bank lending decisions is not very well spelled
out in the paper. Dobson and Kashyap believe that banks in China are still
under pressure to make policy loans to support state-owned enterprises.
And they imply that the requirement placed upon banks to support these
enterprises has been fairly persistent over the past two decades.
But this approach is not satisfactory in two dimensions. First, the share
of bank lending going to state-owned companies has fallen by half over
the past decade, in part because the state-owned sector has shrunk relative
to the economy as a whole, and in part because banks have become more
selective lenders. At year-end 1995, borrowing by state-owned enterprises
accounted for 83 percent of all loans from the banking system.
1 By the end
of November 2004 this share had fallen to 43.5 percent.
2 A large part of
this decline is explained by the rising importance of lending to the house-
hold sector; such lending was nonexistent before 1997. By the end of 2005,
11.2 percent of all bank loans outstanding were to retail customers. At the
margin the share of households in annual credit expansion was much larger:
18 percent in 2003 and 19 percent in 2004, but falling to 8.5 percent in 2005,
according to data from the People’s Bank of China.
Second, the authors’ undifferentiated approach does not take us far in
explaining the volatile pace of bank lending over recent years. Bank lending
began to accelerate at the end of 2002 and hit an all-time-high expansionary
1. Lardy (1998, p. 83).
2. Zhao (2005; this is an interview with the deputy director of the Investigation and
Statistics Ofﬁce of the People’s Bank of China).
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3. People’s Bank of China (2006).
4. Data on state-owned companies in this comment include traditional state-owned
companies, which are typically 100 percent state-owned, as well as state-owned companies
that have been reorganized as share-issuing corporations but in which the state remains the
dominant shareholder. The ofﬁcial statistics refer to the latter as “state-controlled share-
holding companies.”
5. China Statistical Yearbook 2005, p. 500.
6. China Statistical Yearbook 2006, p. 36.
pace in 2003, when the stock of yuan-denominated loans outstanding
increased by 2.77 trillion yuan, an amount equal to 20.3 percent of China’s
2003 GDP. Lending growth moderated signiﬁcantly in 2004 and 2005: loans
outstanding grew by 14.1 percent and 12.8 percent of GDP in those years,
respectively. Then, however, lending surged to a near-record pace in the ﬁrst
half of 2006, when the stock outstanding increased by 2.18 trillion, equiv-
alent to 23.8 percent of ﬁrst-half GDP as reported by the NBS. New loans
extended by Chinese banks in the ﬁrst half of 2006 were a stunning 50 per-
cent more than in the same period in 2005.
3 What is it about the “pressure
to make policy loans” that leads to this particular temporal pattern?
My second point concerns how the authors deﬁne and measure policy
lending. Can one still assume, as the authors have implicitly done, that all
lending to state-owned enterprises should be regarded as policy lending?
Should we regard the two-ﬁfths of loans outstanding to state-owned enter-
prises at year-end 2004 as a proxy for policy lending? Or is a growing
share of this lending, at least in the industrial sector, driven by commer-
cially oriented banking practices? Reported before-tax profits of state-
owned industrial companies have soared in the wake of the industrial
restructuring that accelerated in the mid-1990s. By the ﬁrst half of 2006,
before-tax proﬁts of state-owned industrial ﬁrms were 4 percent of GDP,
compared with 1 percent in 1999.
4 Much of this quadrupling of proﬁts is
due to shrinkage in the ﬁnancial losses suffered by the subset of state-owned
industrial ﬁrms that are unproﬁtable. These losses fell from 115 billion
yuan, the equivalent of 1.4 percent of GDP, in 1998 to 66.9 billion yuan,
or 0.4 percent of GDP, in 2004.
5 In part the growing proﬁtability of state-
owned manufacturing ﬁrms stems from a substantial reduction in employ-
ment in ﬁrms that remain state owned. The sharp fall over time in additions
to inventory as a share of GDP also contributed. In the mid-1990s average
annual additions to inventories exceeded 5 percent of GDP. In 2003–05
these additions averaged 1.4 percent of GDP.
6 Although the Chinese
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authorities have not released data on inventory accumulation by owner-
ship type, it seems a fair assumption that, historically, inventory accumu-
lation has been concentrated in the state-owned sector and made possible
by the preferred access these firms had to credit lines from state banks.
It also seems likely that a disproportionate share of the reduction in the
rate of inventory accumulation over the past ten years has occurred in
state-owned ﬁrms.
In short, the stylized facts are roughly that, through the mid-1990s,
state-owned firms were required to maintain excess employment, tended
to operate as output maximizers, and financed the buildup of inventories
through an ever-growing volume of working capital loans from state-
owned banks. But under the political leadership of Jiang Zemin and Zhu
Rongji, these firms were authorized to shed excess workers, and banks
were put on notice that they would be judged by measures of performance,
such as return on assets and reductions in the share of nonperforming
loans. Increased profitability of state-owned firms and dramatic reduc-
tions in inventory accumulation suggest that these policies have borne
some fruit.
Finally, Dobson and Kashyap’s estimate of the cost of bank recapital-
ization is $250 billion, substantially below an estimate I published two years
ago.
7 There are two major reasons for the difference. First, they almost
certainly misinterpret the data on the rates of recovery achieved by the
asset management companies that were created to take over 1.4 trillion
yuan in nonperforming loans from the four largest state-owned banks and
the China Development Bank. The paper quotes various secondary sources
suggesting recovery rates of around 20 percent. These sources, in turn,
reﬂect Chinese press reports of the four asset management companies of
recovery rates in that neighborhood. What is less well understood is that
these recovery rates are gross and do not appear to take into account either
the operating costs of the asset management companies or their interest
costs. The asset management companies must pay interest at 2.25 percent
a year on the bonds they issued to the banks in exchange for about 820 bil-
lion yuan in nonperforming loans (an exchange that valued the loans at
their face value). They also must pay interest on about 600 billion yuan in
loans from the People’s Bank of China, which they took over from the
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banks as part of the bad debt swap process.8 Since the net recovery rate of
the asset management companies almost certainly is negative, they will
be unable on their own to redeem the ten-year bonds they issued in 1999
or to repay the central bank loans.
9
Second, Dobson and Kashyap do not attempt to estimate the cost of
recapitalizing the Agricultural Bank of China (a large state-owned bank
with acknowledged nonperforming loans of more than 25 percent), the
dozen or so national shareholding banks, the more than 100 city com-
mercial banks, or the system of rural credit cooperatives. Guonan Ma esti-
mates that as of early 2006 the total cost of recapitalization of all banks
and rural credit cooperatives stood at almost 4 trillion yuan (equivalent
to $500 billion, or 22 percent of revised 2005 GDP), and that by the time
the job is completed (including fixing the massively insolvent Agricul-
tural Bank of China and ﬁnishing the recapitalization of the rural credit
cooperatives and city commercial banks), the tab will likely exceed 5 tril-
lion yuan ($620 billion).
10 Moreover, Ma’s estimate includes no forward-
looking component (that is, the possibility of new nonperforming loans
emerging with a future economic slowdown), and he, too, assumes that
the reported recovery rates of the asset management companies are net
rather than gross.
Lawrence H. Summers: I learned an enormous amount from this paper
by Wendy Dobson and Anil Kashyap. I am not in a position to evaluate,
still less to challenge, its major factual claims, and so I will focus instead
on three broad conceptual issues that I hope the authors will explore in
future work.
First, I was struck by the authors’ relatively optimistic attitude toward
China’s banking problems—even the most negative of the outcomes that
they consider are not actually all that bad in a long-term perspective. The
authors suggest that the costs of the mishandled Chinese banking problems
they address are on the order of 7 percent of GDP. Yet at least some other
observers would argue that the black holes in the Chinese ﬁnancial system
today are comparable to those in the Japanese system at the beginning of
8. Lardy (2004, p. 107).
9. From published information it is impossible to tell whether the asset management
companies are paying interest on the central bank loans.
10. Ma (2006b).
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in the aftermath of the bubble economy were a key cause of that country’s
stagnation, which has now lasted more than a decade. From this one would
suppose that if everything that could go wrong in China’s banking system
did go wrong, the cost would surely be close to an order of magnitude
greater than 7 percent of GDP.
The point can be made in another way. Banking policy may be an area
where James Tobin’s famous dictum about how “it takes a heap of Harberger
triangles to fill an Okun gap” (that is, losses due to inefficient resource
allocation are far smaller than those due to aggregate demand reductions)
applies in spades. This has been illustrated again and again around the
world. Think, for example, of the problems in the U.S. thrift industry in the
1980s and early 1990s. The resources misallocated into empty ofﬁce build-
ings and other such ventures were the least of the real losses to the U.S.
economy. Much greater were the burdens placed on taxpayers for the
bailout of the savings and loans and the drastic contraction of bank credit
that ultimately led to recession.
This brings to mind a crucial set of issues that I never got clear in my
own mind regarding Japan’s ﬁnancial system in the 1990s. The Japanese
faced two largely opposing imperatives. One was to have a microeconom-
ically rational banking system: to write off bad loans in the right way, have
banks apply proper credit standards, refrain from engaging in nontransparent
defensive lending, and so forth. The other was to provide aggregate demand
stimulus to a deﬂating economy. I always worried that the policy advice
that the international community seemed to be urging on Japan was based
on the notion that cutting off defensive or policy lending and addressing
nonperforming loans would somehow stimulate aggregate demand. It was
never entirely clear to me why that was supposed to be so. The issue is not
unlike those that often arise in discussions of European economic policy,
where not all good microeconomic policy is as good as neutral in aggre-
gate demand terms. Think, for example, of the short-run impact of measures
that encourage layoffs as a way of increasing the productive efﬁciency of
large enterprises.
How does all of this apply to China’s challenges? I am not altogether
conﬁdent in the authors’ implicit assumption that the principal objective
of Chinese banking policy should be to improve the functioning of the
banking system by curtailing loans to money-losing enterprises. Perhaps an
equally important objective is to avoid the kind of bubble and subsequent
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troubled state enterprises to hot real estate projects would necessarily help
the Chinese economy in the long run.
I hope, therefore, that in future work the authors will integrate their views
on Chinese banking with a view on Chinese macroeconomic policy. For
I see distressing signs of similarity between China recently and Japan in
the late 1980s. Both countries enjoyed remarkable growth, and both were
admired and feared by global customers and competitors. Both faced polit-
ical exigencies that placed constraints on any substantial appreciation of
their currencies, and both intervened heavily in the currency markets. Both
experienced little product price inﬂation but relatively easy money and
sharply rising asset values. And both had problematic, bank-centered ﬁnan-
cial systems that lent heavily to preserve social stability as well as to make
proﬁts. As various studies by the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank have demonstrated, major banking crises with large spillovers
to the real economy are the rule, not the exception. It seems to me that
the most important question for the Chinese authorities is how to avoid a
full-blown crisis.
Second, I worry that, in their forecasting and in their policy recom-
mendations, the authors do not engage adequately with the liability side
of the banks’ balance sheets. I would have thought that a crucial aspect of
China’s problem over the next decade was increasing competition for the
funds now held in the form of bank deposits. As foreign banks come in
seeking to intermediate between households and quality businesses, and
as the capital market opens, either through explicit legal change or non-
explicitly through the growing leakiness of capital controls, households
will discover more attractive places to put their money than institutions
whose returns are constrained by the fact that they are making mostly bad
loans and getting periodically bailed out. Thus, as the sophistication of
the Chinese ﬁnancial system increases, one would expect more pressure
on Chinese banks to raise their deposit interest rates.
So a crucial question becomes, How are these institutions going to
maintain the inﬂow of deposits that has to date been supported by ﬁnan-
cial repression? If the banks are unable to attract funds as households ﬁnd
alternative vehicles for their savings, or as reforms directed at increasing
social insurance or at promoting the consumption-led growth encouraged
by the world’s macroeconomists take hold, the result will one way or
another be greatly increased pressure on their state enterprise clients. The
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is traditionally a dangerous time for reforming economies.
My third issue goes to the very nature and purpose of an analysis like the
one the authors present. What, in the end, are the objectives of the policy-
makers to whom the recommendations are addressed? Perhaps there is a
policymaker somewhere in China whose desire is to maximize a social
welfare function that gives some appropriate weight to the general good
of all the citizens of China. But this is probably not a good way of think-
ing about the incentives motivating the current senior leadership in China
or, I suspect, their underlings. Their objective is probably better concep-
tualized as maintaining political stability by perpetuating the role of the
Communist Party, with some additional weight given to beneﬁting the group
that in Russia would be called the nomenklatura.
It is an interesting question, and not one that I am competent to address,
as to whether policymakers best advance social welfare by giving primary
weight to political stability achieved through the continued dominance of
their party. Is Russia’s evolution over the last seventeen years a positive
or a negative example for China? This is a profoundly important historical
question. But there is no question that, for the Chinese leadership and
many others in China, it is an example of what to avoid.
In a context like this, the lessons of public choice theory become quite
relevant in understanding economic outcomes and in providing policy
advice. Early in my life as a young academic, I stumbled upon the obser-
vation that huge quantities of water were being channeled to central Cali-
fornia, for agricultural use, at a price equal to 2 percent of that charged in
Los Angeles. I had the bright idea that this should not happen, that the
controls should be eliminated and the water allowed to ﬂow to wherever it
would command the highest price. More worldly ﬁgures than I explained
to me that this was completely unrealistic, because of the political power
of the growers and their representatives. They further pointed out to me
that the value of the water subsidy had been capitalized into the price of
agricultural land, so that there were some real issues of fairness.
I reﬂected on the matter for a few moments and came up with a better
idea. Why not allow water to ﬂow efﬁciently but compensate the growers
with an appropriate stream of revenue, thereby producing a Pareto improve-
ment that made everyone better off? My new idea was better than my ﬁrst
one, but it, too, involved real political problems. The last thing that the
growers or their representatives wanted was for the magnitude of the subsidy
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dollar ﬁgure that could be haggled over each year in the budget process.
The very opaqueness of the subsidy that I condemned as an economist was
its essential virtue from the viewpoint of those who had created it and those
who defended it.
I recount this tale because I suspect the same kind of forces may be at
work in Chinese banking. Perhaps the very objective of Chinese banking
policy is to make it possible for nontransparent, capital market-based sub-
sidies to go to state enterprises favored by the Communist Party. If so,
policymakers may be already achieving their objectives and therefore will
not be interested in advice of the kind the authors provide. To make progress
in this case, one would have to persuade the policymakers to change their
objectives or ﬁnd ways of placing pressure on them to do so.
The point can be made more concretely. Suppose some version of the
authors’ plan were adopted and the policy lending function of the large
banks were hived off. How large would the resulting gains be? Presum-
ably they would not be large for the economy as a whole if all the policy
lending continued at some other set of institutions. If some of it stopped,
this would surely be good in terms of economic efﬁciency narrowly deﬁned,
but what about social stability? It is not easy to know.
Like experts in many ﬁelds who give policy advice, the authors show a
preference for ﬁrst-best, textbook approaches to the problems in their
field, while leaving other messy objectives acknowledged but assigned
to others. In this way, they are much like those public ﬁnance economists
who oppose tax expenditures on principle, because they prefer direct expen-
diture programs, but do not really analyze the various difficulties with
such programs; or like trade economists who know that the losers from
trade surges need to be protected but regard this as not a problem for
trade policy. Perhaps the authors are right, and the separation they suggest
would represent an improvement from all points of view. But I am not
sure that transparency with regard to who is being bailed out and who is
being invested in would be seen as a good thing by many of the actors in
China.
I also suspect that the current lending practices of Chinese banks include
a considerable element of what George Akerlof and Paul Romer, in another
Brookings Paper, describe as “looting.”
1 Loans are made to parties in some
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Party leaders. This is probably an important tool for the government in
maintaining loyalty and stability, which would become much more difﬁ-
cult if all this lending were gathered together in a single policy lending
institution.
More generally, it would be valuable for the authors in future work to
trace the potential winners and losers from the suggestions that they are
making and to analyze the likely sources of support and opposition. With-
out a clearer understanding of the political roots of current practices, out-
siders will likely ﬁnd it difﬁcult to contribute to their improvement. Indeed,
those seeking to improve Chinese banking need to confront at the outset a
profound question of strategy. Should their effort be directed at persuad-
ing policymakers that they can better achieve through reform the objec-
tives they have already chosen, or should it be directed at encouraging or
shaming policymakers into changing their objectives?
I dwell on this social choice-theoretic perspective because it seems to
me of profound importance as the rest of the world comes to terms with a
rapidly growing Chinese economy in the years ahead. For a generation
now, China has had perhaps the best-performing large economy in the
history of the world. It has maintained political stability through a period of
radical change much better than most observers would have expected
twenty years ago. Although China faces huge challenges, it would be a
great mistake to presume that its leaders have not properly gauged their
own interest in setting policy.
General discussion: Several panelists focused their comments on the role
of the Chinese Communist Party and of political economy in the process
of bank reform. Richard Cooper believed the Party was traumatized by
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Soviet party.
Hence, while pursuing modernization, the Party places a high priority on
maintaining the loyalty of the 60 million cadres who are its members and
have mid-level to senior operating positions, not just in the state-owned
enterprises but throughout the economy. He argued that most bank loans
are not policy loans dictated by a strategy from the top; rather they reﬂect
decisions made at the local level, based on local judgment about the bal-
ance of pressures necessary to maintain both political stability and Party
loyalty. The banking system as it currently operates is intimately related
to Party control and is not going to be reformed easily. In this situation the
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letting their relative importance gradually diminish with growth of the econ-
omy, as Nicholas Lardy suggested is already happening. In the meantime
these so-called loans can be considered quasi-ﬁscal expenditures that should
not cause signiﬁcant problems. Yingyi Qian reminded the panel that although
many of the loans are to money-losing state-owned enterprises, some are
to extremely proﬁtable state monopolies such as oil companies.
Gustav Ranis agreed with Cooper’s remarks and noted that stability is
the ﬁrst priority of the Chinese decisionmakers. The history of the Chinese
economy shows that, at least at the factory level, stability was achieved by
underground and indirect arrangements designed to keep the cadres happy,
but it was also realized that these activities are subject to a loss of efﬁ-
ciency. Within factories, Party members set the rules initially, but gradu-
ally technicians were allowed to take over because the losses were too
great to simply keep following the Party line. This seems to be happening
today at both the macro and the micro level: there is always a trade-off
between the stability achieved by welfare payments through indirect routes,
and loss of efﬁciency. This seems to argue for a gradual movement in the
direction of a more efﬁcient system, with trade-offs becoming more and
more weighted in favor of economists’ solutions.
Ranis also commented on the authors’ view that policy lending should
be done explicitly by the policy banks. The political reality is that such
lending cannot be too transparent, but rather has to be done in an opaque
system that hides it from the general public and other observers, both
domestic and international.
Qian agreed that a primary goal of the Party leadership is political sta-
bility. He believed the Party recognizes that political stability is closely
linked to ﬁnancial stability, as the experience of Indonesia and Russia has
shown. On the other hand, in the minds of the current leadership, ﬁnancial
stability is also linked to ownership and control of the big banks, and that
is why the government still aims to control at least two thirds of the shares
of the Big Four banks. However, with better ﬁnancial regulation, Qian did
not consider this link any longer valid. He predicted that Party leaders will
eventually realize that ownership and control are no longer necessary to
maintain ﬁnancial stability, and then they will revise their position.
Ranis speculated that the creation of a bond market will signiﬁcantly
alter the banking situation. Debt ﬁnancing now runs mostly through the
banks because there is no bond market, but with the entry of foreign banks
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banking problems.
Qian predicted that when the restrictions are lifted so that foreign banks
can market their services to Chinese households in all regions, foreign
competition will have a much bigger impact than the paper assumes.
David Backus noted that the truly striking feature of China’s ﬁnancial
system is that 90 percent of ﬁnancial assets ﬂow through the banking sys-
tem, making banks far more important there than in the United States or
even India. He suggested that pension and capital market reform might
have a larger impact on banks than bank reform. Countries that have pri-
vatized at least part of their pension systems have typically found that it
provides political support for the kinds of institutions that support well-
functioning capital markets. Capital markets provide alternative investment
opportunities to households and alternative sources of funds to businesses.
Something of this sort would automatically draw funds out of the banks,
forcing them to improve their operations in order to compete. In China,
pension reform is almost inevitable in some form, given the rapidly aging
population and patchwork retirement system.
Robert Gordon thought that the similarities between the nonperform-
ing loan problems in the Chinese and Japanese banking systems gave a
misleading impression of the overall similarity of the two countries’ ﬁnan-
cial problems. He saw three important differences: Japan has had slow
growth in monetary aggregates, whereas China has had rapid growth in
monetary aggregates; Japan has experienced asset deﬂation, which has no
analogy in China; and many of the bad loans in China are directed at state-
owned enterprises, a practice that has no analogy in Japan. Therefore com-
parisons between the two countries are not always helpful. As an aside,
Gordon commented that one of the Chinese miracles is the extent to which
infrastructure has been built ahead of economic growth. One often hears
about Indian cities that run out of electricity, and even the United States
has major transmission bottlenecks, but one does not hear about such
problems in Chinese cities.
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